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Abstract
Foundational philosophical beliefs about mathematics in the mathematical community may have an unappreciated yet profound impact on ethics in mathematical
practice and mathematics education, which also affects practice. A philosophical
and historical basis of the dominant platonic and formalist views of mathematics
are described and evaluated, after which an alternative evidence-based foundation for mathematical thought is outlined. The dualistic nature of the platonic
view based on intuition is then compared to parallel historical developments of
universalizing ethics in Western thought. These background ideas set the stage
for a discussion of the impact of traditional mathematical beliefs on ethics in the
practice and education of mathematics in the mathematical community. This is
compared to the potential of a belief in evidence-based mathematical foundations
on mathematical practice and education.
Keywords: ethics, foundations, mathematics

1. Introduction
In an interview on a Hidden Brain podcast [48], organizational psychologist
Adam Grant said our belief (what we think is true) can drive what we value
(what we think is important). In other words, what we believe about the
world can influence our ethical and moral beliefs. This article articulates
how foundational beliefs about mathematics may influence ethical beliefs in
mathematical practice and high school/college education, with an emphasis
on how education affects practice.
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I will first describe several philosophical traditions of mathematical ontology
and epistemology, namely platonism and formalism, along with logicism.
Although I believe the responsibility is on proponents of those traditions to
give evidence for their validity, I will give a summary of the arguments against
these. In the process, the evidence of what mathematics actually is will be
provided: that mathematics is a historically contingent, psychological, and
social enterprise constrained by empirical knowledge and mental metaphors.
Next, I will discuss how platonism and formalism may be negatively affecting
ethics in mathematical practice and education. Finally, I will describe how
an acceptance of the human and social nature of mathematics can improve
moral actions in mathematical practice.
2. Mathematical Platonism
In the West, there has been a continuous conversation about what is “real”
(philosophical ontological inquiry) for over two thousand years. In mathematics, the Pythagoreans may have been the first to conclude “numbers
are things” [8, page 31], i.e. that numbers are real. Incidentally, they also
said “things are numbers” [8, page 31] because of their observation of how
mathematics could explain the world around them. The latter is a tradition that Tegmark [45] has built on to describe a philosophy where the
universe IS mathematics. As described by Brumbaugh [8], the Pythagoreans
believed that numbers are independent of observers, have precise identities,
and are the same for every observer. Unlike material objects, numbers have
no history or location. Thus, according to the Pythagoreans, they exist in
a different world from ours which humans can explore. Note, however, that
the Pythagoreans still ascribed shape, gender, and other characteristics to
numbers.
The Pythagoreans laid the foundations for the idea of other worldly mathematical objects, and on that foundation, Plato systematically developed a
broader theory of Forms. In Plato’s Forms we see the creation of a theoretical system ordering knowledge and reality using the Pythagorean idea of an
other-worldly reality for things we “know that”, such as mathematics. With
these Forms representing different degrees of reality (what is), Plato develops
an epistemology (what we know) based on a hypothetical connection between
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a Form and the knowledge of a material object, with a progression of becoming and being [8, page 158]. Plato’s efforts provided order to his system of
thought and reality, ultimately stemming from the most “real” Form, the
Good, at the top of a hierarchy of Forms which was also asserted by Parmenides [8, page 158]. However, Plato may have had doubts about his theory
of Forms. MacIntyre [37, page 45] describes the difficulties Plato encounters
when trying to combine forms having a common characteristic in Plato’s dialogue Parmenides, leading to an infinite regress. It should be noted that
early Christian philosophers essentially adopted this Platonic framework by
replacing the form Good with God at the top of the system of Forms [8, page
31]. The Forms and the ultimate Good Form set up an ongoing ontological dualism in Western thought between physical and non-physical entities
through medieval times with Christianity’s spiritual entities, and into the
Enlightenment with Descartes’s mind-body dualism.
An important epistemological question is: how do we come to know those
other-worldly entities, specifically mathematical entities? Immanuel Kant attempted to answer this question through his concept of intuition [33, page 23,
pages 50–53]. He argued that foundational mathematical ideas are necessary
and a priori truths (which Kant seemed to consider equivalent), essentially
meaning they are true in all possible worlds regardless of the physical experiences for any individual that has sufficient background knowledge. In
addition, by Kant’s definition, they are synthetic, essentially meaning they
aren’t true just by conceptual analysis (by simply the meaning of the terms).
Thus, if we don’t know these ideas by conceptual analysis nor by physical information from the real world, Kant argues we know them by intuition. One of his often-cited examples is the “truth” of the concept of a
triangle. Kant argues that our conceptions of space explain this intuition
of foundational necessary geometric truths [31, pages 28–29]. It is asserted
that this Kantian intuition provides mathematicians with a mechanism for
claiming to know mathematical non-physical objects (Forms). An example
of this influence can be traced forward to Gödel [22]: “But despite their
remoteness from sense experience, we do have a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see why we should have less confidence
in this kind of perception, i.e. in mathematical intuition [emphasis added],
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than in sense perception.” In another example, Frege [20] argued for support
of the existence of mathematical objects through semantics and truth.1
There have been several critiques of mathematical Platonism. Bernays points
out that the paradoxes discovered in set theory imply the impossibility of two
simultaneous ideas: (1) The totality of all mathematical objects and (2) “the
general concepts of set and function” [5, page 261]. Thus, real mathematical
objects as construed by traditional Platonism is impossible. Benacerraf describes an argument, which includes different set representations of numbers,
concluding that “there is no more reason to identify any individual number
with any one particular object than with any other” [2, pages 290-291]. But
then what can Platonism mean if we can’t identify a unique object with a
number, the most basic mathematical entity? Kitcher’s solution is instead to
re-orient our understanding of mathematical ideas such as sets and functions
away from mathematical platonism and to ultimately base those ideas on
our experiences, concluding “just as acceptance of the approximate truth of
geometry entails no acceptance of the actual existence of ideal geometrical
objects, so too, our acceptance of the approximate truth of set theory and
arithmetic does not fill our ontology with Platonic entities” [32, page 134].
Let’s now return to the epistemological question: how do we gain knowledge
of platonic mathematical objects? Knowledge of such objects relies on a
prior knowledge of at least some foundational mathematical objects (for example through Kant’s intuition). Kitcher [33] has painstakingly and persuasively described how the possibility of such a priori mathematical knowledge
is unlikely, except in the case of universal empirical knowledge. Universal
empirical knowledge is a priori knowledge obtained from empirical perceptions, which we would obtain in any world where we had sufficiently rich
experiences [33, page 31]. By defining a rigorous definition of mathematical apriorism, Kitcher argues strongly against the existence of three types
of a priori mathematical knowledge: conceptualist, constructivist, and realist (platonist) [33, page 47]. In other words, believing that mathematical knowledge arises from “intuition” is unsupported by a rigorous analysis.
1
Frege’s position referred to here is briefly outlined in https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/platonism-mathematics/#FreArgForExi, last accessed on July 21, 2022.
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To summarize, although we cannot prove such non-physical entities don’t
exist, there are strong arguments for why they do not exist and if they did
exist, then we cannot access them.
3. Formalism and Logicism
Formalism emerged with an emphasis on the rule-based approach to mathematics, where we begin with axioms and symbolic rules which then generate
true propositions. Thus, formalism consists of syntactics and symbol manipulation, not semantics. There have been a variety of flavors of formalism, but
probably the most influential is Hilbert’s program, where Hilbert “asserted
that there was a certain type of evident reasoning which was presupposed in
all scientific thinking, and finitist operations were typical of these” [34, page
208]. Thus, Hilbert’s hope was that of “a final solution of the problem of
foundations by a reduction of all mathematical reasoning to finitist reasoning” [34, page 209]. Since Hilbert, other formulations of formalism are given
in Curry [13] and Cohen [12]. Logicism differs from formalism in that the
rules used in logic are the basis for fundamental mathematical truths. But,
like formalism, there are no referents in the mathematical or logical terms;
the terms say nothing about anything in particular but only state logical
truths.
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems put Hilbert’s formalist program in doubt.
More importantly, Hersh points out that mathematicians’ proof is not the
axiomatic proof as described by the formalist or logicism adherents; mathematicians’ “reasoning is semantic, based on the properties of mathematical
entities, rather than syntactic, based on properties of formal sentences” [30,
page 103]. “Following a proof is to engage in a particular kind of psychological process”, and more specifically a proof is a “sequence of statements
such that every member of the sequence is either a basic a prior statement
or a statement which follows from previous members of the sequence in accordance with some apriority-preserving rule of inference” [31, page 37-38].
In effect, the “truth” of a statement starts with basic a priori statements and
that truth is preserved by allowable inferences. First, as discussed above,
there are no a priori mathematical statements not derived from experience.
Second, there are a variety of inference rules (logical systems) for which we
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could generate mathematical “truths”. Which do we use? We are now back
to mathematical practice being concerned with semantics (meaning) to make
such fundamental decisions, and where logic is then a subfield of mathematics, not the other way around.
4. An Evidence-based Alternative to Platonism. Formalism, and
Logicism
Searle [41, pages 563–564] discusses the difference between epistemic objectivity and subjectivity. Epistemic objectivity is the hallmark of science where
“scientists seek truths that are equally accessible to any competent observer
and that are independent of the feelings and attitudes of the experimenters
in question” [41, page 563]. It is reasonable to argue that this can only be
approximated, since all experimenters will bring their biases into their research. In addition, the word “truth” here must also be approximated since
science consists of models of reality, not exact truths. With those caveats,
the contrast to epistemic objectivity, epistemic subjectivity, then means the
question at hand cannot be settled with such (approximate) independence.
However, ontological objectivity and subjectivity are different. Ontological
objectivity is the existence of the objects in question independent of consciousness, while ontological subjectivity implies the existence of the objects
in consciousness.
Mathematics is like science in that we have a competent mathematical community to decide if there is “truth” to tentative results made public to the
community. Just as in science, the “truth” of the result is determined by the
mutually agreed upon standards of reasoning of the mathematical community. This is how the mathematical community develops knowledge, and thus
there is epistemic objectivity (approximately). On the other hand, mathematicians’ “objects”, mathematical concepts and ideas, are ontologically subjective; they exist in our consciousness as qualitative, subjective, and unified.2
They do not exist independently, as argued in previous sections.
2

Searle [41] describes three aspects of consciousness: Qualitative, Subjective, and
Unity. Our conscious states have a “qualitative feel” to them and that quality could not
exist without a particular subject experiencing it. We experience conscious states as a
unified whole, not in pieces.
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The evidence and theory of the source of our mathematical knowledge is
described extensively by Lakoff and Nuñez [36]. Starting as infants, there
is strong evidence that humans (and a variety of animals) have an innate
understanding of numbers and very basic arithmetic. There is also evidence
of specific locations in the brain where arithmetic calculations and algebraic
manipulations occur. See [36, Chapter 1] for a summary of the early research
on this. Thus, it does appear that we may begin life as humans with some
universal empirical mathematical knowledge. Note, however, that there is no
evidence that this knowledge derives from independent non-physical objects.
Lakoff and Nuñez then develop a theory of mathematical ideas based on evidence in the cognitive sciences on how humans conceptualize ideas, and they
describe embodied cognition by “mind as it arises through interaction with
the world” [36, page 350]. They argue that cognitive mechanisms lead to our
mathematical ideas, which include common mechanisms used for “basic spatial relations, groupings, small quantities, motion, distributions of things in
space, changes, bodily orientations, basic manipulations of objects, iterated
actions” [36, page 28], and more. Note that these mechanisms arise directly
from our interaction with our physical surroundings. For example, our basic
spatial relations lead to various mental “schemas” such as above, in contact
with, support, and container. The container schema gives us our starting
point for the mathematical ideas of sets.
Another important concept is that of conceptual metaphor where we develop
and understand our abstract mathematical concepts through more basic concepts, ultimately based on our interactions with the world. For example, the
container schema is the basic embodied concept that are metaphors for first
order logic. “An enormous range of empirical evidence has been collected that
supports this view of conceptual metaphor” [36, page 47]. It is through these
metaphors that we produce the huge richness of mathematics. For instance,
the beginning of this process of creating mathematical ideas is addition as the
adding of objects to containers or collections. We are not discovering mathematics but creating it through conceptual metaphors, ultimately based on
our physical experience in the world, and validated by our mathematical
community of agreed upon standards of proof and our view of mathematical
“truth”.
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In addition, Kitcher [33] developed a mathematical philosophy that aligns
with the evidence of Lakoff and Nuñez. Kitcher describes an ideal agent theory whose basic components implicitly foreshadow the evidence-based theory
of Lakoff and Nuñez and other cognitive researchers. Kitcher also illustrates
several examples of how mathematics changes, such as mathematical practices, language, accepted reasoning, and what is believed to be true (and
thus what is considered knowledge). Thus, the direction of mathematical
change, the very “truth” of mathematical statements, and what mathematical objects are considered real or legitimate are historically contingent. For
example, from approximately ?
1600 onward, there was disagreement over the
validity and interpretation of ´1, which also caused a re-interpretation of
other mathematical
? objects. Since there is no number whose square is -1,
then how could ´1 be a number? This required a re-interpretation of what
numbers are, for example as objects that particular operations could be applied to. Note?that this mathematical change was driven by the usefulness
of the object ´1 in mathematical work and in scientific inquiry. In addition, this mathematical change required a change of mental representation,
of what the referent for a number is. Thus, again, mathematical reality is
ontologically subjective, i.e., a subjective experience of construction, not a
perception of external objects.
Lakoff and Nuñez [36, pages 360–362] also give an example of historical dependency in the mathematics of floating point arithmetic, which depended
on the development of computers. Similarly, Kitcher [33] provides examples
of mathematics developed to solve problems within the mathematical and
scientific community, not to “discover” other-worldly objects. An example is
calculus, where Newton’s creation of his flavor of calculus was to describe
motion while Leibniz’ creation of his version of calculus was to solve the
tangent problem. Finally, there are multiple historical instances when new
mathematical developments were rejected by the mathematical community
but were eventually accepted. An interesting example is the construction of
multiple infinities by George Cantor in the late 1800s, which were lambasted
as abominations by mathematicians as prominent as Leopold Kronecker.3
3
Many good references to this history may be found; see for example Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Cantor, last accessed on July 21, 2022.

Richard Spindler

57

Rather than viewing these historical examples platonically, as first not “seeing’ their existence and yet somehow later “seeing” their existence, it seems a
better explanation is that mathematics development is based on mathematical history, culture, and accepted practice.
Following up on this last example, it is important to briefly discuss the interaction of culture and mathematics. Culture is a set of beliefs, customs,
traditions, and other aspects of a particular human society. In the last example, though more investigation on Cantor’s case would shed light, a reasonable hypothesis is that the strong reaction to Cantor’s inventions and
results was that it violated what some in the mathematical community considered accepted standards of proof and what are traditional mathematical
objects. This is an illustration of how cultural conditions (in this example
within the mathematical community) could influence mathematics development. Regarding how pure mathematics may influence culture, there is some
evidence that the Pythagoreans created a cosmological theory out of their
beliefs about integers and arithmetic [6]. A more recent example is the results in number theory and their wide impact on cryptography and electronic
communication. As Wilder [49] describes, multiple cultural processes have
impacted the development of mathematics, including the printing press, language, and scientific developments within a particular society, and vice versa.
More recently, the impact of sociopolitical ideas (such as power structures)
on mathematics education has been studied, as described in [26] for example.
To summarize, what we have seen in our analysis of mathematical “foundations” is that the essence of mathematics is mathematical practice based
on human cognition interacting with the external physical reality through
metaphors and with our cultural environment. Mathematics is constrained
by (1) the basic innate mathematics of universal empirical mathematical
knowledge and (2) the cognitive metaphors that we use for reasoning in mathematics. Furthermore, its development is historically contingent and depends
on what is considered acceptable reasoning by the mathematical community
at the time, based on the cultural context during its development. Thus,
mathematical practice is a creative, human, and cognitive-based endeavor restricted by accepted reasoning and conceptual metaphors, ultimately based
on real world experiences. “Because of its cultural bases, there is no such
thing as the absolute in mathematics; there is only the relative” [49, page 196].
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To put it in Searle’s terms, mathematics is ontologically subjective, but may
be also considered external in that it subsists in a historical and cultural context. Note that having historical and cultural aspects does not imply that
mathematics is arbitrary; this is because of the above constraints imposed
on it. These constraints are substantial and explain the extreme stability of
mathematics over time.
5. A Brief History of Western Ethics as related to Mathematics
The myths of platonism and formalism ignore the historical and social context
and contingencies of mathematics, as described in the last section, dehumanizing mathematical practice. Similarly, Western ethical theories tended to
be produced as if untethered to the historical point or cultural milieu they
were created in. Once created, they were presented as fixed and permanent.
Indeed, “[p]hilosophers and other intellectuals still betray, even if they less
frequently parade, a cluster of habits of conceiving reason (moral or otherwise) as: separable from any cultural conditioning, transcending time and
not historically conditioned, at its best when detached from a community
of co-investigators, substantially separated from the limitations of physical
life, and able to be cleaved from feelings and bodily inclinations. Reason
is in a word pure, structured, and operating independently of the practical
pressures of living” [19, page 29].
That idea of individualistic ethical reasoning untethered from our humanized
state or our daily lives is unfounded just as platonism is. Let’s briefly review
this theme in Western ethical thought. In ancient Greece, an action by a
person was judged to be good or moral if it the action was due to virtues
that were developed because of the role that person had in social life and in
the community. In other words, an action was ethical if a person expressed
certain virtues as well as completed his (and then it always was about males)
duty as circumscribed by their role in the community [37, Chapter 2 and
pages 166-167].4 Aristotle was a prototypical proponent of this virtue theory
4

Hume argued that morality cannot arise from factual truth, described succinctly that
“ought” cannot be determined by “is”. However, Hume admits that our wants and needs
influences our norms [37, page 175]. Macintyre’s argument countering Hume is as follows:
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of ethics, which in his view was developed through habit. The ancient Greek
model is that one’s role implies one’s duty: is affects what ought. Both our
psychological nature and social context (what is) contribute to and influence
our moral actions (ought).
Over the centuries, the Greek idea of roles changed and were made more
malleable, coinciding with the rise of individualism. For example, the rise
of the protestant reformation stressed the individual’s personal contact with
God. Thus, the original moral meaning of duty, and hence social norms, was
lost. Kant reaches an important historical inflection of universality and yet
individualistic trend by (1) arguing that moral rules are a priori, independent of experience and the material world [37, page 192] (see also [46, pages
84–86]), and (2) the moral rules satisfy a categorical imperative. This means
that a moral actor would want the rule to universally apply to all moral
beings and in all appropriate situations. We as individuals judge if a rule
meets this categorical imperative and should be an ethical norm; individualism triumphs.5 An important aspect of this is that consequences are not
considered. Kant defines duty to be following the ethical norms, satisfying
the categorical imperative, shown to us by intuition. Thus, Kantian ethics
falls back to intuition as justifying universal ethical norms, independent of
history, culture, or practical human action, just as mathematical platonism
relies on intuition.
This use of intuition in ethics was presaged by St. Thomas Aquinas’ claim
that we “rationally intuit natural law” [7, page 69], and of course Aquinas
specified particular principles and natural inclinations that he felt persons
should intuit as “natural”. Early in the 20th century, Moore [38] continues
this tradition of intuitionism in determining what is considered the “good”.
And this individualistic tradition continued in various subsequent theories.
Hume asserts that reasoning alone cannot cause action and only moral evaluations can,
though reasoning can inform those actions. Clearly this cannot be true for all actions. For
example, if I know that a robber is planning on robbing my house tonight, then reason
tells me I should take some preventative action.
5
The other part of Kant’s categorical imperative is that persons should be treated
as ends, not as a means. Brannigan [7, page 133] argues that Kant is saying this means
respecting their moral right to self-determination and autonomy. Again, individualism is
paramount.
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For example, MacIntyre [37, page 262], while discussing Hare’s analysis [29],
argues that “Hare’s prescriptivism is, in the end, a reissue of the view that
behind moral evaluations there is not and cannot be any greater authority
than that of my own choice. This is a repetition of Kant’s view of the moral
subject as lawgiver”, as given through intuition.
Another feature that mathematical platonism and Western ethics share is the
inherent dualisms in these theories. Mathematicians have created incredibly
beautiful ideas but then, as described in an earlier section, some ascribe to
those ideas an otherworldly ontological status separate from our own human
existence, the platonic myth. In its more extreme form of Kantianism, ethical
theory is determined by individualistic intuition also divorced from the social
context in which conduct (which defines ethical action) is performed. All
that matters is what the moral actor intuits as one’s duty consistent with
the categorical imperative. As Fesmire points out, “So, for adaptive purposes,
we speak of thought and thing, mental and physical, internal and external,
idea and sensation. We split experience from nature, signifier from signified,
representation from represented, word from object. Then we mistakenly
conclude that these binaries correspond to independently existing entities
or states of affairs, like Descartes’s res cogitantes and res extensa” [19, page
47]. However, as described in earlier sections, our mathematical ideas are
not independent of our brains, our natural world, our social context, and
our historical location. Similarly, our individual conduct and direction in
mathematical practice are not independent of our culture and our placement
in society, mathematical or otherwise.
To summarize, there appear to be important similarities between the currently dominant threads of mathematical philosophy and Western ethical
philosophy. Namely, that the objects (in mathematics) or the proper ethical actions to follow (in ethics) are independent of human experience and
context, operating separately from social and historical trends, and that we
have a mysterious intuition of these objects or right actions. It seems, then,
it should not be surprising that mainstream voices in the mathematical community would deny that mathematical practice and development (at least
in “pure” mathematics) has any meaningful relationship with current human
experience or with ethics beyond one’s individual actions.
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6. Ethics and Mathematical Foundations
Now let’s consider some specific situations for how our view about mathematical foundations may impact ethics in mathematical practice and instruction. First, we examine who is considered worthy to do mathematics. Grant
and Kahneman [24] describe two model systems of the mind: System 1 and
System 2. System 1 is that system that operates automatically with little
voluntary control (sometimes also called intuition). System 2 is our mind
focusing attention and effort on mental activities that we experience as conscious control and choice. According to [24], the mind’s System 1 forms a
narrative for us that fits our pre-conceived unconscious network of knowledge
and beliefs. Now recall Grant’s statement that “our belief can drive what we
value” [48]. Thus, our mathematical ontological and epistemological beliefs
will impact our values and hence our conduct through our mathematical
practice. Specifically, a danger of the Platonic view of mathematics is that
it provides a convenient reason for a practicing mathematician to hold preconceived beliefs, where the mathematician may not be aware of why they
really hold such beliefs, due to the workings of System 1.
Suppose now that we have been subsumed in the Platonic view of mathematics, where mathematical objects are discovered by a mathematical intuition.
The often-unstated argument is: If you don’t possess that special intuition,
then you are not capable of doing real mathematics. That mathematicians
might see only some as capable mathematical researchers is actually driven
by our current social, historical, and ethical context informing our unconscious network of beliefs, a context where sexism and racism in our society
are starting to be recognized more fully. Thus, our ethical decisions as practicing mathematicians are determined by the social context we are in, which
in turn determines who practices what mathematics, and thus guides mathematical development.
In effect, the platonic myth of intuition provides an outward justification for
our pre-conceived ideas of who is capable. The idea that there are people
who can do scholarly mathematics and there are those who should only do
practical mathematics has an ancient history in mathematics. D’Ambrosia
describes this history, from Egyptians to Greeks to Romans in [14].
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Once platonism, and its enabler, the supposed intuition of mathematical objects, are established as the paradigms within an already systemically racially
biased society, then bias and racism may establish themselves as the lens in
viewing who is able or worthy to learn mathematics. For example, Chestnut
et al. [10] and Storage et al. [44] describe how groups that are not considered
to possess brilliance and talent in a field, such as mathematics, are underrepresented in that field. This “myth of brilliance” appears to impede the
mathematical progress of practitioners and students alike. And the racism
can be much more direct. For example, several early pioneers of statistics,
such as Francis Galton, used statistics to justify their eugenics beliefs. This
racial and ethnic bias in Western mathematics in general (beyond foundational beliefs) is described in [40]. “We cannot escape the fact that statistics
is a human enterprise subject to human desire, prejudice, consensus, and
interpretation” [11]. As described earlier, mathematics is no different; it is a
human enterprise.
Similarly in high school and college instruction, it is plausible that belief
in mathematical platonism has the potential effect of perpetuating, through
teachers, the belief that only some people are worthy enough to engage in
mathematical practice. If you are not considered capable of doing real mathematics, then why even try? This leads directly to the fixed mindset of many
students [16]. Lakoff and Nuñez call the belief in mathematical platonism
the “Romance of Mathematics” [36, page 338] and discuss the consequences
of this Romance: “It intimidates people. It makes mathematics seem beyond
the reach. Of even excellent students with other primary interests and skills.
It leads many students to give up on mathematics” [36, page 341]. Any high
school or university teacher can attest to the common statement of students
that “I am bad at math” or “I cannot do mathematics”. ‘‘The Romance
serves the purposes of the mathematical community. It helps maintain an
elite and then justify it” [36, page 341]. In other words, it leads to a vicious
circle where people who have been elevated as capable become practicing
mathematicians and then carry that philosophy forward in their instruction.
Next let’s examine WHAT areas of mathematics are considered worthy of
study. Consider the divide between pure and applied mathematics as exemplified by Hardy’s statement that “[w]e have concluded that the trivial mathematics is, on the whole, useful, and that the real mathematics,
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on the whole, is not" [28, page 43]. Though originally stated in 1940, discussions of this biased binary view of mathematics can regularly be found subsequently, such as expressed by panelists in the 1962 symposium on applied
mathematics [9], up to today. The idea that the greatness of mathematics
derives from its abstractness and independence from physical reality, as described by Stone [43] implies a hierarchy of worthy subject areas, creating
division that damages the profession and mathematical development. Besides
being incorrect about mathematics being independent of physical reality (as
described in Section 2), the interplay between abstraction and applied mathematical pursuits supports each other and creates progress for both.6 Again,
Newton’s and Leibniz’ invention of calculus are excellent examples of this.
Finally, note that which scholars are given leadership positions (in mathematical and research associations) and which ones receive attention are also
affected by what mathematics is considered worthy.
The danger of formalism is different but also problematic. In a formalistic
view, mathematics becomes meaningless, consisting of moving symbols according to pre-defined rules.7 Though I believe it would be difficult to find
a practicing mathematician agreeing that their work is completely meaningless, that undercurrent of meaninglessness appears to imply that there are
no ethical quandaries to consider in mathematics itself. However, surely the
potential and actual use of the variety of mathematical creations throughout
society requires ethical choices to be made, as in any scientific discipline. A
recent example is the mathematics used in artificial intelligence, which faces
fundamental ethical questions [25].
In education, every mathematics high school and college instructor has encountered students that view mathematics in this purely formal manner (possibly most of their students!). Where does this come from? If an instructor
begins to absorb the formalist view as their own foundation, then it would
become natural to teach this formalism AS mathematics, regardless of what
actual mathematical practice really is. Some mathematics students (and
even instructors) find following established rules and determining the “correct” answers comforting. Unfortunately, as emphasized above, that is alien
6
7

Courant makes an eloquent statement on this in [9].
In cultural terms, this is called symbolic reflex behavior [49, page 193].
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to how mathematical practice actually works and, in fact, can be detrimental
to meaningful student learning and problem-solving. “It is part of a culture
that rewards incomprehensibility . . . Socially, the inaccessibility of mathematics has contributed to the lack of adequate mathematical training in the
populace in general” [36, page 341]. Finally, this educator belief in formalism
impacts mathematics itself, not just education, as Wilder states “It moves
one to wonder how many potentially great mathematicians are being constantly lost to mathematics because of ‘symbolic reflect’ types of teaching”
[49, page 194].
So why is mathematics taught in this formalist framework? Certainly, educating formally is easier than demanding a fuller student understanding and
expecting a student to apply the mathematics to new situations. Also, as
described by Handal [27], traditional instructional beliefs are difficult to dislodge, with teacher’s beliefs guiding their instruction. But there may be a
deeper reason which also illustrates the impact of a formalist view. Kollosche
stated that “it gives us the opportunity to judge your ability and willingness
to be a logico-bureaucratic subject” [35, page 307]. His argument is that
mathematical education based on formalism is training in following rules,
needed for many jobs and roles in our society. Closely related, the formalist
reasoning in math education leads to a de-humanization of our lives in society. “By focusing on technical means and not on the ends of their actions,
persons, governments and corporations risk complicity in the treatment of
human beings as objects to be manipulated, in actions that threaten social
well-being, the environment and nature” [18, page 8].
7. Moving Forward
What is ethics? Ultimately, ethics is about making judgements to guide conduct, and, as expressed by John Dewey, the purpose of ethics is to live a rich
and meaningful life. John Dewey believed that conduct has two aspects. The
first aspect is having a life of purpose, where we have “thoughts and feelings,
ideals and motives, valuation and choice” [15, page 2]. The second aspect
is an individual’s relationship with nature and human society. Thus, ethics
cannot be separated from our personal goals, practical situation, historical
context, and our social life. Note the similarity of this approach to mathe-
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matical practice that occurs within a social and historical context, based on
the goals and predilections of the mathematical community of the period.
Thus, Dewey’s ethical approach is more aligned with mathematical practice
than the traditional Western ethical trend as described in an earlier section.
It is time we re-consider our roles as mathematicians and how our foundational and ethical beliefs impact our mathematical practice, which then
impact our ethical conduct. In contrast to the traditional Western ethical
philosophy, John Dewey argued that we should stop searching for a single
ultimate principle that will answer our ethical problems for us because there
are none.8 This is because in our practical social lives, there will always be
inherent conflicts in which we must balance incompatible aims and values. As
a pragmatist, he identified three types of ethics that we will balance: virtue
ethics, deontological ethics (that is, ethics determined by duty, which could
include a sense of justice), and consequential ethics (of which John Stuart
Mill’s utilitarianism is the most well-known example) [19, page 56]).
Sometimes a mathematician might say they just research “math” and just
teach “math”, as if mathematics is a body of knowledge independent of everything else, which also provides a convenient excuse not to reflect on one’s
role in mathematical practice. Instead, we should consider what it means to
practice and impart mathematics from a humanistic standpoint, balancing all
three types of ethics in that practice. From the point of view of virtue, what
character traits do we want to encourage in ourselves as mathematicians and
students as future mathematicians? From the deontological standpoint of
justice, we should actively resist the fables of brilliance and so practice and
educate mathematics in a manner that counters those fables, promoting equity and justice. In addition, we should consider the potential consequences
of our mathematical work and instruction on society. For example, what are
the consequences of formalism? Not only does it remove the understanding
8

For example, to apply Kant’s categorical imperative to any practical situation, we
must restrict its applicability to those actors in that particular situation. The problem
with this is that with sufficient thought and restriction, nearly any proposed rule can be
universalized, and this thus makes the categorical imperative without content [37, pages
197–198]. This also provides an argument that Kant’s rule does not provide an ironclad
universal ethical principle but instead one of several possible guides in deciding one’s
conduct, much like “do unto others as you would have done to you”.
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of mathematics, but its basic formulation is strict rule-following. Is that
what we think is best for a democratic society? Finally, a re-orientation
from traditional philosophic beliefs to a humanistic, evidence-based orientation may move us toward cooperation, instead of division and elevation of
favored areas of mathematics.
How we educate students is also an ethical choice that impacts future mathematical practice, our society, and future generations in countless ways. Ernest
[17] argues that the first philosophy of mathematics education should be
ethics. Peck [39] claims that five aspects of mathematics education are affected by the foundational philosophic choice of educators and the educational system. These are (1) mode of learning (authenticity and how active
the pedagogy is), (2) classroom cultural environment, (3) historical viewpoint, (4) critical examination of mathematics in society, and (5) social interaction in mathematical practice. A humanistic belief in mathematics leads
to authentic and active learning with a classroom culture that empowers
students to invent and create. An evidence-based approach to foundations,
based on our shared humanity, leads to a rich historical account of mathematics and thus a way for students to see themselves as active “actors” [39, page
8] in mathematics. Seeing the direction of mathematics as historically contingent can lead mathematicians and students to critically examine choices
made in mathematics past and present. Finally, through authentic activities
and the humanistic approach to mathematics, students and researchers alike
can appreciate mathematics as the social enterprise it is, where the community of practitioners decide what results are acceptable and worthwhile in
the human context they currently live in.
The evidence is that we first experience basic mathematics in our interactions with the material world, and mathematicians build on that experience through a psychological and socially created enterprise within certain
constraints. Thus, contrary to mainstream Western philosophical thought,
mathematics is inseparable from physical, psychological, social, and historical context, as is ethics. Because of that, mathematics does not exist in
some separate realm; on the contrary it is fundamentally tied to mathematical practice, a human enterprise. Mathematical practice can be performed
ethically or not, and because mathematics and practice are inseparable,
mathematics itself have ethical aspects, along with mathematics education.
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Mathematics is an intensely human and social endeavor. In that view, mathematical practitioners and instructors would see each person as having the
potential to live a complete and fulfilling life which includes experiencing
mathematics for what it is: as a human and social enterprise. This is what
it means for mathematics, its practice, and mathematics education to be
ethical. It is time our mathematical community seriously reflects on and
transforms its foundational beliefs so it can grow and contribute to our society in an ethical manner.
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